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SUMMARY
The SystemStatusDisplaystudy is partof the AdvancedTransportOperating
Systemsprogramsponsoredby the NationalAeronauticsand Space
Administration'sLangleyResearchCenterand is directedtowardthe
developmentof advanceddisplayinformationfor the flightdeck operationsof
futurecommercialaircraft. The SystemStatusDisplay (SSD)is an electronic
displaysystemwhich providesthe crew with an enhancedcapabilityfor
monitoringand managingthe aircraftsystems(i.e.,hydraulics,electrical,
etc.). The potentialbenefitsto be gainedthroughthe use of electronic
displaysare improvementin crew performance,reducedprobabilityof error,
and more efficientworkspaceutilization. It is anticipatedthat these
benefitsin crew proficiencywill significantlyenhancethe efficiencyand
safetyof terminalarea operations.
INTRODUCTION
The overallobjectiveof the currentstudy is to establishgeneralprinciples
and guidelinesfor the designof electronicsystemdisplays. The technical
approachto this probleminvolvesthe applicationof systemengineeringto the
designof candidatedisplaysand the evaluationof alternativeconceptsby
part-tasksimulation. This reportcoversthe systemengineeringportionof
the study and the selectionof candidatedisplays.
The study identifiesdisplayinformationrequirementsbased on detailed
analysisof representativeflightoperations. This analysisincludesthe
developmentof a sequentialiterativemodel of the crew functionsinvolvedin
the operationof the aircraftsystems. This model is used to developa task
flowdiagram identifyingall the crew decisionsand actionsnecessaryto
. manage and monitorthe aircraftsystems. The informationrequirementsfor
each of these tasks are identifiedby reviewof the systemoperation,mission
- requirementsand flightphase requirements.The informationrequirementsare
partitionedintofour distinctclasses:
IDENTIFIERS. The nameor labelof an item such as a switch legend.
DESCRIPTORS. Informationregardingthe elementsof a system and
their functionaland spatialrelationshipsimilarto those that
might appear in a systemsdescriptionmanual. k
SYSTEMSSTATUS. The operationalstate of the systemincluding
parametervaluessuch as hydraulicpressure.
INSTRUCTIONS.The operationalprocedurenecessaryto establishor
modify the systemconfigurationsuch as the checklist.
This classificationschemeaids in the identificationof informationsources
(e.g.,system sensors,proceduresmanual,etc.) and the selectionof specific
displayformatsbased on knowledgeof human informationprocessingand human
engineeringdesign criteria.
The selectionof alternativedisplayconfigurationsis based upon existing
•knowledgeof human memory codingstrategiesand memory structure. The basic
principleis that the fewer cognitiveprocessingsteps requiredby the crew,
the quickerthe responseand the less chancefor errors. In general,
comprehensionof informationregardingthe relationshipsamong the system
componentsand dynamicsof systemoperationis facilitatedwhen the
informationis presentedin a formatthat is compatiblewith a pictorialor
"iconic"memory code. Itmay alsobe hypothesizedthat informationregarding
a set of actionsthat are performedserially(e.g.,a well definedprocedure)
can be comprehendedmore readilywhen presentedin an orderedtext format.
Since the SystemStatusDisplaymust performboth functions,optimizationof
the individualdisplayformatrequiresa full understandingof crew
informationrequirementsand how the informationwill be used within the
contextof the intendedmission. In order to achievethe desiredlevel of
L
display-operatorcompatibility,three alternativedisplayformatswere
mechanizedfor experimentaltest: pictorialonly, printedword lists,and
pictorialinformationwith printedword instructions.
The proposedsystemconsistsof a displaygenerator,a matrix display,and
controland sensorinterfac_;s.The fliuhthardwarewould be redundantand
would be interfacedwith other displaycomponents,i.e., the primaryflight
and the flightmanagementdisplays. For the simulation,a high resolution
three-colorshadowmask CRT was used as the matrix display.
In generala displayby exceptionphilosophyis used. Accordingto this
philosophy,informationis presentedonly if it is requiredin order for the
crew to performthe requiredtask or to informthe crew that the systemstatus
or the operationalenvelopeof the aircrafthas changed. The crew has the
optionof callingup more detailedstatusinformationat any time.
A summarypage is presentedas the baselineformatfor all flight phases
unlessthe crew calls up a systemspage. The summarypage contains
alphanumericalerts and selectedsystemparametersthat are relevantto the
particularphase of flight. A dedicatedcontrolpanelmay be used to call up
a systemspage. The first systemspage presentsthe statusof the system.
Additionalpages containmore detailedinformationand may be called up by the
advancepage key. The first line of the systemspage (see Figure9 for
example)containsidentificationof the systemand alertsif any exist. The
next three lines are reservedfor procedures. The remainderof the display
containsthe pictographor the printedword formats. Establisheddisplay
design guidelinesbased on human engineeringand graphicdesign principles
were used to generatethe displayformats. Alternativedisplayformatswere
generatedfor the fuel, hydraulics,and the flightcontrolsystems.

BACKGROUND
Advances in digital electronics and CRTtechnology add new dimensions to
cockpit designs. These advances allow increased versatility in the crew
interface design and the assignment of crew roles in flight and system
management functions. The major portion of the crew tasks in aircraft systems
management involve monitoring system status and detecting system faults. Our
present knowl edge of humancapabilities and limitations indicates that routine
monitoring functions can be performed more efficiently and reliably by
automatic devices. The inherent capability of contemporary electronic
equipment will allow the designer to allocate many of these functions to
automated elements of the system. The crew will then be able to devote more
attention to primary duties of decision making and flight management.
Increasedautomationoffers the potentialfor reducingthe crewworkload.
This is counteractedto some degreeby a trend towardincreasingsystem
complexity,a reductionin crew size, and constraintson workspacelayout.
These factorstend to modify traditionalcrew roles and duties. The
proportionof time devotedto systemsmanagementtasks has increased
substantiallywhile manual controltask demandshave decreased. Insteadof
manuallyoperatingthe aircraft,the crew performsprimarilyanalytical
functions. This changein crew roles has raisedsome flightsafety issues.
In a reviewarticleon the role of the crew and automationin flight,Weiner
and Curry (1980)identifiedseveralissuesthat have a potentialimpacton
flightsafety. The primaryconcernsexpressedby Weiner and Curry were the
failureof the crew to recognizeand respondto failuresof automatic
equipment,and the loss, or lack,of learnedskillsto performin a manual
backupmode.
Over the last six years, Rouse (1981)has investigatedthe role of automation
in aircraftapplications. As a resultof his researchstudiesand the
b
recognitionof the safety issues,he proposesthe following:
A
i. An adaptiveautomationwhereinunder normalconditions,the crew performs
manualoperationsand, as the workloadincreases,automationis used to
assistthe crew. This allows the crew to maintaintheir skill level and
have the advantagesof automationwhen it is necessary.
2. As an aid to problemsolvingtasks,the computeris used to prompt the
crew, i.e., the computerassiststhe crew by trackingcrew actionsand
tellingthe crew the imPlicationsof their actions. Rouse'sempirical
studieshave found that this type Of assistancereducesthe numberof
human errors.
The traditionaldutiesof the crew in the managementof aircraftsystems
includeoperationalswitchingof systemhardware,on-linemonitoringof system
status for faultsor changesin the system,and reconfigurationof the
aircraftsystemwhen a fault is recognized. Currentcommercialaircrafthave
substantialautomationand redundancyat thesystem level as opposedto the
displaylevel. The crew interfaceis composedof hardwired,dedicated
electromechanicaldisplaysand controls. Fault detectionlogic and
annuciationare built intomost aircraftsystems. These fault annuciations
are simple out-of-tolerancedetectorsand are hardwiredto an annunciator
light,an aural alarm,or a voice warningdevice. Currentaircrafthave a
large numberof annunciatorsand the simple logic contributesto a large
numberof false alarms. These false alarmshave been a major concernof
pilots and system designers(Cooper,1977 and Randle et al., 1980). Recently,
the FederalAviationAdministrationhas been supportingan effort to arrive at
design standardsfor a commercialtransportaircraft'scockpitalertingand
warningsystem (Bouceket al., 1981). These standardsincludepriorityand
inhibitlogic for presentingwarning,cautionary,and advisoryalerts.
The conceptof a computeraided,multifunctionsystemmanagementdisplay first
appearedin the early 1970's. Bauerschmidtand La Porte (1976)suggestedthat
it was the adventof CRT displaysand digitalprocessorsthat allowedthe
conceptof a multifunctiondisplayto become a realityfor statusmonitoring.
They reportedthat such a displayhas many potentialadvantagesincluding
improvedreactiontime, decreasederror rate, and a simplifiedhardware
interface.
The use of a CRTsystem monitoring display and a digital computer was
incorporated into a study performed by Hughes Aircraft Companyfor the Air
Force (Streeter et al., 1973). This display presented functional status
• values, caution and warning annunciations, mode advisories, and checklists.
The hardware consisted of a single CRTwith multifunction switches whose
" functions were indexed by legends on the CRTdisplay, and a digital display
processor. The page formats of the CRTwere printed word lists and the
structure of the page varied according to the nature of the fault. Evaluation
of the concept was not reported.
Boeing Aircraft Company performed a study for the Air Force with the objective
of identifying requirements for multifunction displays in military cockpits
(Graham and Broomhead, 1975). This study identified the following
requirements but did not provide any supporting data for the requirements:
1. Graphic displays have limited utility and are not required in a
multifunction display.
2. When graphicinteractionis required,a cursor controlis more effective
than a light pen or a touch panel.
3. Mul ti function switches should be programmed by peripheral equipment and
be capable of changing modes automatically.
4. Functional data or parameter values should be displayed.
5. A system should be designed to provide maximumutility and minimum
workl oad.
In a study conducted by the Air Force (Bateman et al., 1980) multilegend
. switches, CRT indexed switches, and CRT page formats tailored to a specific
fault versus a branching logic were evaluated empirically. The first page of
the format with the branching logic provided a summary of the system and
subsequent pages provided more detailed status. The results of this
evaluation showed that response times and errors were less for the multilegend
switches and the tailored logic was superior to the branching logic.
McGee and Harper (1980)describeda statusmonitoringsystemfor a rotarywing
aircraft. This conceptused a single CRT displayto presentstatus,
procedures,and parametervalues. Dedicatedswitcheswere used for CRT page
call up and systemscontrol. The CRT formatswere printedword lists for
statusand procedures,and bargraphsfor parametervalues. The designconcept
was not evaluated.
A forerunnerof the currentprojectat DouglasAircraftwas an engine
monitoringand displaysystem,EMADS (Mas et al., 1979)., EMADS is an
integratedenginemanagementsystemcomposedof a CRT display,a dedicated
controlpanel,and a displayprocessor. The displayformatscontain
structuredtablesof statusinformationand bargraphsof engine parameters.
The displayprovidesengine alertsand proceduresfor correctingthe alerts,
thrust commandsand limits,trend information,and checklistsfor prestart
proceduresand flight planning. The EMADS displaysystemwas recently
evaluatedagainstconventionalinstrumentationin performanceof normal and
emergencyoperations(Po-Chedley,1981). The resultsof this evaluation
showedthat pilotperformancewith EMADS was betteror the same as that
obtainedwith conventionalinstruments. Subjectiveevaluationsby operational
pilotswere favorabletowardsEMADS.
Currentoperationalaircraftwith multifunctionsystemmonitoringdisplays
includethe McDonnellDouglasF-18 and the Airbus IndustriesA310. The F-18
has a monochromaticCRT displayand uses indexingkeys for menu and mode
selection. Index keys are locatedlonthe CRT's edge with the key's legend on
the CRT. System status switchingis performedby dedicatedswitchesand the
CRT page formatsare printedword lists of status,procedures,and parameter
values. Limitedgraphicsare available. The A310 is the first airlinerto
incorporatea multifunctionstatusmonitor. This unit is calledthe
ElectronicCentralizedAircraftMonitor (ECAM)and it is redundantto the
dedicatedinstrumentscontainedin the center and overheadpanel. The ECAM
consistsof two high resolutioncolor CRT displayslocatedin the center
instrumentpanel and a dedicatedswitchpanel locatedon the pedestal.
Dedicatedsystem switchesare locatedin the overheadpanel. The left CRT
pages containprintedword fault annunciations,statuslists,and procedures.
The right CRT containsschematics,graphicsand/or numericdisplaysof
parametervaiues.
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It is apparentthat there are advantagesto multifunctionsystemstatus
displays and they will be incorporatedinto futureaircraft. The primary
advantagesof computerdrivendisplaysare to aid the crew in the detection
and recognitiontasks,to provideprompting,decisionaids, and flexible
displayformats. Althoughpreviousstudiesprovidesome design guidance,
there are a numberof design alternativesand issuesthat need to be
addressed. Key questionsto be answeredmay be summarizedas follows:
i. What is the roleof the crew in reconfiguringredundantsystems? Should
his role only be as a passivemonitorof an automatedsystemor shouldhe
participateactivelyin reconfiguringthe system?
i
2. Dependingon his role,what informationshouldbe presentedto the crew?
What systemengineeringmethodologyshouldbe applied for specifyingthe
information requirements?
3. What formatshouldbe used for displayingthe informationto the crew?
4. What controlinterfacedevicesshouldbe used? Shoulddedicatedcontrols
be used or is"itpossibleto integratethe controlinterfacewith the
displayedinformation?
The approachused in answeringthese questionsincludedthe developmentof a
candidatesystemconcept,the utilizationof systemanalysistechniques to
identifythe informationrequirements,and the selectionof candidate
display/controlformatsand hardwarebased upon the technologythat will be
availablefor the next generationaircraft. The intentis to evaluatethe
alternativeconfigurationsusing part-tasksimulation.

DEFINITION OF THE SYSTEMSTATUSDISPLAYCHARACTERISTICS
The first step towards the development of a candidate concept was to review
the various approaches to aircraft systems management and to identify the
• basic hardware configuration for the SSD. This was accomplished by surveying
system designers and flight operations personnel regarding system management
and display/control philosophy.
INDUSTRYSURVEY
Initially, an in-house committee composed of flight operations personnel,
design engineers, and human factors engineers held a series of meetings to
discuss the issues involved and arrive at a preliminary system concept.
Subsequently, a detailed questionnaire was distributed to system design
engineers and flight operations personnel to solic.it their opinions on the
design issues. The results of this questionnaire are summarized in Appendix
A. This questionnaire was revised and it formed the basis for a structured
interview with the research and developement personnel from three other
airframe manufacturers: McDonnell Aircraft, St. Louis; Lockheed, Georgia; and
Boeing, Seattle. These interviews solicited opinions on the design issues and
approaches to system management displays. The questionnaire and the responses
to the interview are contained in Appendix B.
SYSTEMDESCRIPTION
As_ a result of these surveys, the following system concept was formulated:
The SSD serves as a crew interface for all systems except the flight guidance,
flight management, and the radio management systems. The latter systems have
separate crew interfaces. The SSD consists of dually redundant computers and
CRT displays (or flat panel matrix displays). The SSD computer receives data
from and sends data to the peripheral aircraft systems, the flight guidance
computer, the flight unanagementcomputer, and the caution and warning system.
The SSD computer drives the CRT displays and receives crew inputs via
multifunction switches. A conceptual block diagram of the system is shown in
Figure 1. In addition, there are dedicated, hardwired displays and controls
for backup or when electrical power is not available.
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FIGURE 1. CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMSARCHITECTURE FOR THE SYSTEMSSTATUS DISPLAY
The generaldisplaydesign philosophyis displayby exception. That is, the
mode of operationfor both normaland abnormalconditionsis to presentonly
the informationnecessaryto informthe crew of changesin the operational
envelopeof the aircraftand to reconfigurethe system. However,detailed
status informationis made availableto the crew upon demand.
The followingfeaturesand capabilitiesare prime candidatesfor incorporation
into the SSD.
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DISPLAYFLEXIBILITY• Computergenerateddisplaysallow flexibilityin the
displaycontentand format• The displayformatsare standardizedand are
designedto improvethe crew's abilityto interpretand use the information.
It is anticipatedthat this flexibilitywill increasethe efficiencyof crew
operations,i.e., reducethe responsetime and reducethe numberof crew
errors.
INFORICATIONSTORAGEAND PRESENTATION. Crew proceduresand systemdescriptions
are storedin the computerand displayedin formatsthat are compatiblewith
the presentationof statusinformation. The computeris used to monitorthe
crew actionsand promptthe crew for the next actionor alertthe crew if an
incorrectaction is performed. The systemprovidesfeedbackto the crew
regardingthe resultsof their actionsand annunciateschangesin aircraft
statusor operatingrestrictions•
FAULT DETECTIONAND PRIORITIZATION.Fault monitoringand detectionoccur
within the peripheralsystems. Prioritizationof faultsand flightphase
inhibitlogic occur withinthe SSD computeror a separatecautionand warning
system. The faultsystemuses the guidelinesset forth by the FAA Aircraft
AlertingSystemsstandardizationstudy (Boucek,et al., 1981). Higherorder
monitoring,i.e., interpretationof faultconditionswhen multiplefailures
occur and the analysisof trendsare considereddesirablecharacteristicsto
be incorporatedinto the faultmonitoringlogic•
ALLOCATIONOF FUNCTIONSBETWEENTHE CREW AND AUTOMATEDEQUIPMENT. The level
of automationof the system is the responsibilityof the individualsystem
designer. As a rule, the systemshouldoperatein a hands off mode (i.e., it
shouldbe designedwith a minimumamountof monitoringand controlrequired).
System redundancyshould providea fail operationalcapability(i.e., there
shouldbe automaticswitchingbetweenredundantsystems). In general,the
crew shouldonly become involvedin a systemsoperationif the operational
capabilityof the aircraftor the missionis affected.
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INFORMATIONREQUIREMENTANALYSIS
Within the conceptual framework defined above, the definition of the display
o content was based on a thorough analysis of crew information requirements.
This approach consisted of a task analysis, identification of required
. information, an operational sequence analysis, and classification of the
information. The study was initiated by reviewing the normal and abnormal
procedures for two current commercial aircraft: The MD-80 and the DC-10-30.
This review resulted in the decision to perform an in depth analysis of two
systems and to develop the guidelines and representative formats for these two
systems. The two systems selected were the fuel and the hydraulic systems.
The selection of these systems was based upon their relevance to safety during
the critical phases of flight (i.e., a hydraulic failure impacts the flight
controls and a fuel failure could affect the range, gross weight, and balance
of the aircraft).
The candidate designs for the fuel and the hydraulic systems used in this
study are likely candidates for a next generation, two engine, two man crew,
commercial aircraft. The designs are based upon DC-IO technology with
multiple levels of redundancy and include automated features anticipated by
system designers. Descriptions and block diagrams of these two systems are
presented in Appendix C.
Task flow diagrams were generated for the two systems. A generic example is
shown in Figure 2. These diagrams were generated by using a sequential,
iterative model to describe the crew-system operations.
Accordingto this model, the processof managingthe aircraftsystemsinvolves
periodic reviewof systemstatus. Elementsof this monitoringfunctionare
performedautomaticallyand the outcomeof the statuscheck will determine
what actions(if any) are taken. The generalflow containsthree basic steps:
. 1. Check to determine if the system configuration is nominal and, if not,
reconfigure the system.
2. Check to determine if the actual configuration agrees with command
configuration.
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3. Check the statusto determineif the systemis operatingproperlyand, if
not, a contingencyprocedureis entered.
The remainderof the task flow is designedto accommodatevariationsin
informationrequirementsas a functionof flightphase and to access
informationrequiredfor enteringthe next flightphase.
GO TO
NEXTFLT
PHASE
d
rES
FIGURE 2. GENERIC TASK FLOW DIAGRAM
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The task flow shows only the decisionsand actionsrequiredto completean
operation. The next step in the analysisis to identifythe information
requiredto make the decisionsand/orto performthe actions• The information
requirementswere identifiedby reviewingeach elementin the flowdiagramin
terms of specificinput parametersrequired,the pilot'sknowledgeof the
. system,and operatingproceduresfor necessarycontrolof the system•
Subsequentto the informationrequirementsanalysisan operationalsequence
analysiswas generatedto identifythe sequenceof steps for collectingthe
informationand performingthe necessarydecisionsand actions.
For both the fuel and hydraulicsystems,two procedureswere analyzed- the
normaloperatingprocedureand one contingency• The fuel contingencywas a
tank imbalanceadvisoryand the hydrauliccontingencywas a dual hydraulic
failureresultingin partialfailureof the flightcontrols. These three
analyses:the task analysis,the informationrequirementanalysis,•and the
operationalsequenceanalysisare presentedfor both systemsin AppendixD.
To assist the developmentof displayformats,the informationwas classified
accordingto the way in which the informationis used by the crew. This
classificationschemeaids in the identificationof displayalternativesand
applicationof human engineeringprinciplesto determinethe optimum format.
The informationrequirementswere partitionedinto the followingfour basic
classes:
1. IDENTIFIERS• The name or labelof an item. The sourcemay be eithera
legendor the crew'smemory.
2. DESCRIPTORS• Informationregardingthe elementsof a systemand their
functional/spatialrelationships•The sourceis either the crew's
memory,the systemsdescriptionmanual,or aircraftinstrumentation.
• 3. SYSTEMSTATUS• The operationalstate of a systemincludingany parameter
values. The source is the system sensorsand aircraftinstrumentation.
Q
4. INSTRUCTIONS. The operationalprocedurenecessaryto establishor modify
the systemconfiguration•The source is the checklist,the crew
proceduresmanual,the crew'smemory,or aircraftinstrumentation•
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DISPLAYANALYSIS
Options for displaying information in current aircraft are limited to a large
extent by the inflexibility of conventional display media, Switches are
labeled by printed alphanumerics, parameter values are displayed by
electromechanical instruments (i.e. pointer dials, vertical tapes, or
I
numerical readouts) and descriptive and procedural information is presented in
manuals using a combination of printed words and pictorial formats. Recently,
there has been an attempt to layout the components on the control panels
according to their functional/spatial relationships in the aircraft.
The utilization of digital computers for the processing and storage of
information increases the flexibility of presenting information to the crew
and offers the potential for enhancement of the crew interface. Given the
numerous alternatives for display formats, the problem of identifying the
format which the crew is able to comprehend and utilize most effectively
becomes critically important.
The approach to addressingthese issueswas to first reviewthe displayand
controlhardwarealternativesand to selectthe most viable alternativesfor
empiricalevaluation. The secondstep was to reviewestablishedhuman
engineeringand graphicdesign principlesto arriveat a set of guidelinesfor
the SSD displayformatsand to apply these guidelinesin the developmentof
alternativeformatsfor empiricalevaluation.
DISPLAYAND CONTROLALTERNATIVES
The last decadehas producedmajor advancesin flightdeck technology. One of
the most significantones is the replacementof the electromechanicaldisplays
with computer-generatedimageryon CRT displays. This has allowedthe
tailoringof displayformatsto be compatiblewith the crew's abilityto
• interpret the information and to use multiple formats on a reduced number of
display surfaces. The advances in the control interfaces have been somewhat
" slower. Current commercial transports use dedicated control panels with few
exceptions. However, there are several multifunction control alternatives
which could be incorporated within the next decade.
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Display Technolog_
Contemporaryelectronicdisplaytechnologyemployshigh brightness,high
resolution,three color shadowmask CRT's for primaryflightand status
displays. These displayshave been incorporatedinto the cockpitsof Boeing
AircraftCompany's757 and 767 aircraftand the Airbus IndustriesA3IO
aircraft. The attributesof these displaysincludethe following:
1. High brightnesswhich providesreadablecontrastat ambient illumination
levelsof 8000 foot candles.
2. High resolutionwith a minimumresolvableelementof .010to .012 inches.
3. Full color capabilityusing the three primarycolors. Althoughthe
currentunits only providea limitednumberof fixed colors (i.e.,
approximately15) they have the potentialfor producinga full color
spectrum.
4. Versatileimage generationusing hybrid image generationtechniqueswith
both strokewritingand rasterfill capabilities.
Flat panel technologyhas the potentialfor offeringconsiderablesavingsin
power consumptionand space. Althoughsignificantdevelopmentshave been made
in liquidcrystalmatrix displaysand thin filmelectroluminescencepanels
(Brindleet al., 1980, Knuta, 1981, and Uede, 1981) furtheradvancesare
requiredbeforethey achievethe capabilityand the reliabilityof the CRT
displays. The three-colorshadowmask CRT displayis consideredthe most
viable alternativefor the next decade.
Control Technology
Recently,controlshave advancedfrom toggle and rotaryswitchesto pushbutton
switcheswith backlightedlegends. Commercialtransportaircraftuse
dedicatedcontrols(i.e.,each controlknob or switchhas a one and only one
function). The only non-dedicatedswitcheshave been CRT indexedswitchesand
2O
keyboarddata entry panelson the RNAV and flightmanagementcontrolunits.
CRT indexedswitchesare pushbuttonswitcheslocatedon the edgeof the CRT
with the switchlegendslocatedon the CRT. These mUltifunctionswitchesare
used more commonlyin advancedmilitaryaircraft•
" Other approachesincludemultilegendswitches,touch panels,and voice
recognitiondata entry devices. The only commerciallyavailablemultilegend
switchesare projectionswitchesusing individualincandescentbulbs for each
readout. No commercialaircraftuse these switchesdue to their relatively
poor legibilityat high levelsof ambientillumination.Other alternatives
are LCD, LED, or thin film electroluminescencealphanumericmatriceson the
Switch head. Developmentof these Switchesrequireadvancesin the state of
the art but they could be availablefor the next generationaircraft. Touch
sensitivepanels are transparentoverlayson the CRT displaywhereina switch
is activatedby touchinga specifiedareaon the display. Feedbackis
providedby an audibletone and/ora visualchangeon the CRT display•
Severaltechnologieshave been used for touch panelsand inclUdepressure_ '
sensitivepanels,electrostaticpanels,and LED-photocellarrays.It should
only be a matterof time beforeone of these alternativesbecometechnically
feasible. Voice recognitiondevicesare in early development(Mountfordand
North,1980) and still requiretechnologicaladvancesbefore they become
operationallyfeasible.
There have been empiricalevaluationsof CRT indexedswitchesand multilegend
switches(Batemanet al., 1980). It was found that both responsetime and
error were lowerwith multilegendswitchesthan the CRT indexedswitches.
Thismay be attributedto the legendappearingin a differentlocationthan
the switchwith the CRT index approach. Touch panelshave been criticizedfor
their lackof tactilefeedback(Grahamand Broomhead,1975). There has not
been any empiricalevaluationof touch panelswithouttactilefeedbackor
using other formsof feedback.
• IMAGEPRESENTATIONCONCEPTS
In reviewingrelevantliterature,it was foundthat inadequaciesexist in the
presentguidelinesfor designof CRT displayformats• Pictures,schematics,
word messagesor some combinationof the above have been proposed. Available
2i
data indicatepicturesare betterthan words in communicationof information"
regardingobjectsand their spatial/functionalrelationshipsand tend to
facilitateassociationlearning. Words appear clearerin meaning,are
consideredessentialfor presentationof abstractconcepts,and are regarded
by developmentalpsychologistsas importantin the formationof logical,
sequentialoperations.
A partialexplanationof these differencesis supportedby researchin human
memory coding. Pictorialinformationis believedto be storedin a direct
memory code which bears a close relationshipto the sensoryexperiencethat
gave rise to it (Haber,1970). Words are storedin phoneme (speech
utterances)codes or by the visualpresentationof the phonemes(written
language). To relatethe phonemecode to the visual sensoryexperience
requiresa transitionfrom the visualimage to th'espoken languageand then to
the phonemecode. Theseoperationsrequireadditionalmental processingsteps
when comparedto direct storageof a visualimage.
Two relevantstudieshave evaluatedprintedversus pictorialformats. Booher
(1975)comparedsix pictureword formatsfor instructions: print only,
pictorialonly, and four combinationsof print and pictorial. The four
combinationsincluded: (1) primarilypictorialinformationwith short verbal
statementsfor the actionsrequired,(2) primarilyverbal informationwith
picturesfor object identification,(3) primarilypictorialinformationwith
redundantwords, and (4) primarilyverba| informationwith redundant
pictures. The resultsof this study showedpictorialinformationis important
for speed but word informationis necessaryfor accuracy. Comprehensionof
instructionswas most efficientwith a combinationconsistingof primarily
pictorialinformationwith short verbal statementsfor the actions. In
anotherstudy by Tullis (1981),four differentCRT formatswere evaluated: a
narrativeprintedformat,a structuraltabularformat,a black and white
schematic,and a color schematic. The resultsshowedthat responsetimes were
consistentlyfaster for both of the schematicformatswhile accuracydid not
vary between the formats.
The shorterresponsetimes supportthe conceptthat retentionof pictorial
informationrequiresfewer mental processingsteps than words. Based upon
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this theory,pictorialimageryshouldbe used as much as possible. However,
this dependsupon the type of informationto be transmitted. Nominal
information,i.e., informationknown throughthe senses ratherthan intuition
and thought, shouldbe pictoriallydisplayedsince it has a direct visual
code. Noumenalinformation,i.e., informationconceivedby reason,does not
have a visual image and must be coded in a graphicor a verbal language.
It can be hypothesizedthat identifications,descriptions,and status
informationare best presentedin pictorialimageryor a combinationof
pictorialand alphanumerics. Instructionswhich do not have a direct visual
imagerycould be presentedas or more effectivelywith words. Ifmental
imageryis requiredfor interpretation,instructionswill requiremore
processingsteps than pictures. However,a highly structuredsequenceof
operationsmight be performedquite easilywith printedinstructions.
Human memory studieshave demonstratedthat abstractand symbolicinformation
is stored in long-termmemoryby differentstructures(Posner,1970). The
simplestformof structureis a list. Morecomplex structuresexist including
matriceswhere the dimensionsof the matricesrepresentdifferentattributes,
e.g., a branchingor hierarchicalstructure. One complexstructureis the
physicallayoutof the systemin the aircraft. Symbolicdiagramsshowingthe
functional relationshipof componentsor schematicsis an exampleof another
type of structure. Anotherstructurewould be a proceduralsequenceor a task
flowdiagram.
Based upon the above review,it appearsthat the best methodof presentation
would be a pictorialdiagramof the systemwith printedinstructions. In
order to evaluatethe above concept,it is proposedto test the hypothesis
that significantdifferencesin crew performancewould be foundbetweenthe
followingconditions: pictorialwithoutinstructions,pictorialwith printed
• instructions,and alphanumericsconsistingof printedword lists and printed
instructions. Table 1 shows the three experimentalconditionsand the
• comparisonsthat would be made by the evaluation. The displaypage formats
are describedin detail in a lattersectionof this report.
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TABLE 1
ALTERNATIVE DISPLAY CONCEPTS AND COMPARISONS FOR
THE EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
ALTERNATIVE FORMAT CONCEPTS
CONCEPT FUNCTION
DESCRIPTION INSTRUCTION
b
1 PICTORIAL NONE
2 PICTORIAL ALPHANUMERIC
3 ALPHANUMERIC ALPHANUMERIC
EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISONS
CONCEPT COMPARISONS INFERENCE
1 AND 2 DO SUPPLEMENTARY WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE WITH A PICTORIAL FORMAT?
1 AND 3 WHAT IS THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
PICTORIAL AND ALPHANUMERIC FORMATS?
2 AND 3 CAN DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION BE PRESENTED
•MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH A PICTORIAL
REPRESENTATION?
DISPLAYFORMATGUIDELINES
As a resultof the above analysisand the utilizationof standardprinciples
for human engineeringdesign (Sempleet al., 1979 and Krebs et al., 1978) and
graphicdesign (Morse,1979 and Marcus,1980),the followingguidelineswere
establishedfor the developmentof the displayformats.
GeneralGuidelines
1. Labels, status,and systemdescriptionsare coded by shape or identified
by alphanumerics.
2. Printedaction verbs are used for instructionsand the objectof the
action is identifiedby a symbolor a word.
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3. Color is used to indicatethe operatingstatusof a system. Five colors
are used:
• a. White for the identificationand systemdescription.
b. Green for indicatingnormalstatusor normaloperation.
• c. Blue for advisorystatus.
d. Amber for cautionstatusor to indicatea partialfailure.
e. Red for a warningstatusor to indicatea total failure.
The brightnesscontrastof the five colorswill be adjustedso that they
are nearlyequal. The colorswill be displayedagainsta black
background.
4. Alphanumericsare of uniformintensity. One size is used for the majority
of the information. A largersize is used only to identifythe system.
The size will be based upon the eye design referencepoint and will be
large enoughto provide100 percentrecognitionof color symbols.
Capitalletterswill be used and the font style will be sans serif.
5. In general,a displayby exceptiondesignphilosophywill be appliedand
only informationnecessaryto performthe requiredactionwill be
displayed. In somecases,this philosophymay be modifiedin order to
avoid unnecessarilyfrequentor distractingchangesto the display
formats.
6. The crewwill have the optionto call up additional,more detailed
information. This informationwill be added to the simpleruncluttered
displayby using an overlay.
7. Disagreementsbetweenthe commandstatus and the actualstatus of a
systemwill be sensedand displayedas a fault.
. 8. Both graphicsand text shouldbe presentedas simpleas possiblewithout
degradingthe content. There shouldbe geometricseparationof
functionalgroupson a displaypagewith empty spaces in betweento
increasethe legibilityof displayelements.
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PictorialFormatGuidelines
1. Pictographs will be used. to represent system components and their
functional arrangement. A representative set of pictographs are
presented in Figure 3.
FUEL TANKS, RESERVOIRS _ ELECTRICAL ' OFF _/%-_
• FILL SHOWSRELATIVE _ SWITCH
QUANTITY
• COLOROF FILL SHOWS OK
STATUS
PUMPS
• BACKGROUNDFILL -----_ _-.--.
MANIFOLDS I_ INDICATES STATUS OFF _"
• FILL SHOWSFLOW
• COLOROF FILL SHOWS ON
STATUS
TEMPERATUREGAUGE
• FILL SHOWSRELATIVE
TEMPERATURE "- " •
ELECTRICAL BUS • COLOROF FILL SHOWS '.'STATUS
• FILL SHOWSCURRENT _ii:.iii:.(!i::i::iii::i!iii:.!:.i:.i:.i:.iii:.i:.!:.i!_:_)
i
FLOW PRESSURE GAUGE '
• COLOROF FILL SHOWS • FILL SHOWSRELATIVE
STATUS PRESSURE
• COLOR OF FILL SHOW_
STATUS
VALVES OFF
AMMETER ,_,ON :!:!:i:i:i,_......y_:i:i!i:_'_ • FILL SHOWS RELATIVE
CURRENT N
• COLOROF FILL SHOWS I:iiiJUSTATUS
FIGURE 3. PICTOGRAPHICSYMBOLS USED IN THE PICTORIAL DISPLAY FORMATS
2. Connectinglines in the pictographrepresentfuel manifolds,hydraulic .
manifolds,pneumaticlines, and electricalconnections. Solid color fill
of these lines indicatedthe operationalstate of these lines:empty if
the system is off, green if it is operatingnormally,blue if there is an
advisory,amber if there is a failurecausinga cautionstatusand red if
there is a failurecausinga warningstatus.
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3. Pictographsrepresentingreservoirsare color filled. The amount of fill
representsthe quantitywithinthe reservoirand the color representsthe
operationalstate.
4. Pictographsrepresentingparametervalues,i.e., temperaturegauges,
. pressuregauges,ammeters,etc., are color filledto facilitate
quantitativereadingrelativeto scale values. The color representsthe
operationalstate. Accuratequantitativereadoutsare providedby
numericswhere required.
5. The structureof the pictorialdisplayis a schematicwhich representsa
combinationof the physicallocationand the functionalrelationshipsof
the systemand their elementswithin the aircraft. The general
hypothesesis that a pictorialschematicpresentsthe least abstract
visual image of a systemand it shouldrequirethe least amountof mental
processingto store the imageor recognizechangesin the image.
Printed Word Format Guidelines
1. Noun phrasesare used to labelor identifya systemcomponent.
2. Adjectivephrasesare used to describethe statusof a systemcomponent.
Numericsare used to providequantitativeparametervalues. If interval
or ordinalscale informationis required,a bar graph is used.
3. As in the schematicsystemcomponentsare groupedaccordingto their
physicalas wel'las functionalrelationships.This word structure
providesthe only informationwhich relatesto systemdescription.
Printed Instructions
" 1. Action verbs represent a single action or a sequence of activities.
- 2. The objectof the actionis designatedby an arrow in the pictorial
format and by a word descriptorprecedingthe actionverb in the word
format.
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SYSTEMSTATUSDISPLAYEVALUATION
A part-tasksimulationstudy shouldbe utilizedto furtherevaluatethe
alternativedisplayconceptsand the controlconfigurations.The part-task
• simulationwould be performedin a fixed base cockpitsimulatorand would be
designedto test the abilityof representativesampleof pilotsto operatethe
• aircraftsystemsunder normaland emergencyconditionswith primaryemphasis
on correctingsystemfailures.
The experimentaldesignwould be a factorialexperimentwith the three
alternativedisplayformatstested in combinationwith the three alternative
controlconfigurations.Repeatedmeasureswould be used on a sample of ten to
twelvepilots. A full factorialdesignwould be used to test for interactions
betweenthe displayand the controlalternatives. Trainingon the respective
display/controlconfigurationwould be providedprior to initiationof the
exPerimentaltrials.
!
Al_thoughthe systemis designedfor a normaltwo-mancrewconfiguration,the
experimentwilltest the abilityof one crew member to fly the aircraft,an'dI
performthe systemfunctions. This will representa hypotheticalworst case
conditionwhen a crew member is lost. The test conductorwill occupythe
right hand seat to provideinstructionsand observe,
An experimentalrun would consistof the pilot flyinga straightin approach
patternto decisionheightusing the flightdirectorguidancemode. Random
disturbances,simulatingwind gustswould be used to establishthe desired
level of workloadon the flighttask. Duringthe approach,singleor multiple
faultsof the fuel and/orthe hydraulicsystemswould be introduced. The
pilot would be requiredto detectthe fault via the master cautionand warning
system and correctthe faultvia the SSD while maintainingflightpath
control. All eventswould be recordedon a timeline.
The dependentperformancemeasureswould be the responsetime and the response
- accuracyin correctingthe fault. Flight task performancewould be measured
by the flightpath and speed deviationsfrom the desiredvalues. A two-way
statisticalanalysiswould be used to determinesignificantdifferences
betweenthe treatmentconditions. The treatmentalternativeswould be ranked
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on the basis of producingthe least numberof errorswhile havinga minimum
effect upon flighttask performance. In addition,the pilotswould be asked
to subjectivelyrate the differentalternatives. The correlationbetweenthe
subjectiverankingsand the objectiveperformancemeasureswould be evaluated.
o
SYSTEMSTATUSDISPLAY SIMULATOR
In order to demonstrateand evaluatethe alternativeconfigurationsa
part-tasksimulatorwas developed. This simulatoruses a fixed base cockpit
with computerdrivendisplaysand a terrainmodel system for outsidevisual
reference. The equationsof motion,the DC-IO aerodynamicsand controlsystem
models, and simplifiedmodels of two engines,the fuel system,the hydraulic
system,and the SSD formatsare providedby a DigitalEquipmentCorporation
VirtualAddressExtension(VAX 11/780)computer. This is linkedto a- .._.._i_._...:-,.
...." satellitecomputerthat interfacesthe controls,the cockpit and the visuai;'
referenceterrain model_ gs_t_m,.,:'.ilT_"c_oal_p_].a#dOt<;_nd._i._st_umentationis a
modified DC_IO_._::'T_T;S_D":d_slpl;ay'is a 6-inchARINC size C,high brightnessCRT
:iocTa£ei_d_;ii!nii_thle<_"l"o_ve'rleftcorner of the centerconsolethat is normally
•occupiedby.the standbyflightinstruments. The remainderof the
instrumentationis providedby the DC-IO electromechanicalinstruments.
The SSD display is drivenby a VectorGeneralgraphicsdisplaygenerator.
This generatoris a calligraphicsystemand allowsreal-timeprogrammingof
animatedgraphics. The formatinstructionsare providedby the host computer.
The SSD has a dedicatedcontrolpanel in thetop left cornerof the forward
pedestalwhich is normallyoccupied by the RNAV controldisplayunit. The SSD
controlpanel uses backlitpushbuttonswitchesand a separatekey is used for
each system. A systemmay have more than one page which can be called by
advancepage or back page keys.
The switchesfor controllingthe fuel and the hydraulicsystemsare provided
in three alternativeconfigurations:
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I. A dedicatedpanel locatedin the forwardpedestaland aft of the SSD
controlpanel. This containsbacklightedpushbuttonswitches. Each
system functionhas a dedicatedswitch.
2. A multifunctionswitchpanel in placeof the dedicatedswitch panel in
- the forwardpedestal. This panel containsmultilegendpushbutton
switchesusing projectionswitchtechnology. The functionof the
switchesis controlledby the SSD panel. The switcheswill displaythe
legendsand controlthe systemthat is selectedupon the SSD panel.
3. A touch paneloverlayingthe SSD CRT. This panel uses a pressure
sensitivemembrane. A systemfunctionmay be changedby touchingthe
symbolor word identifierfor the component. An audibletone provides
feedbackthat a switchhas been activatedand the component'soperational
state will change on the display.
The locationof the SSD displayand the controlpanels are shown in Figure4.
Any differencesin performancebetweenthe touch panel and the other two
configurationscould be attributedto the followingfactors:
1. Separatelocationsfor the systemdisplayand the controlswitch panels
versusthe same locationwith the touch panel.
2. Differencesin spatiallocationand reach betweenthe switchpanelsand
the touch panel.
3. Differencesin sensoryfeedbackbetweenthe switchpanels and the touch
panel.
Outlinedrawingsof the SSD controlpanel and the dedicatedfuel and
hydraulicscontrolpanelsare shownin Figures5 and 6, respectively. The
multifunctioncontrolpanel containsa 3 by 5 array of switches. This array
. has eitherthe legendsfor the fuelor hydraulicsystemas shown in Figure7,
dependingon which systemhas been selected.
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SSDCRT
SSDANDMULTIFUNCTION
CONTROLPANELSi
FIGURE 4. FIXED BASECOCKPIT SIMULATOR WITH THE SYSTEMSSTATUS DISPLAY
SSD
. ADV ADV
AC/PNEU ELEC FLT CON FLT PAGE
PHASE
m
i
i i i
FIRE BACKFUEL HYDPROTECT PAGE
POWER WATER/
ICE/ RAIN PLANT WASTE SUMMARY SCROLL
FIGURE 5. SYSTEMSSTATUS DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL
CRT FORMATS
The CRTpage structure consists of summarypages and system pages. The
summary pages contain the alerts and status information pertinent to the phase
of flight. The system pages contain fault indications and status information
related to a specific system.
Summary Page
The summarypage containsa prioritizedand sequentiallyorderedlist of
alertsrequiringthe crew'sattention. Printedwords insteadof pictographs
were used for this page since the fault list representsa highly structured
sequenceof recommendedactions.
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FUEL
1 AUX 2
FILLVAL FILLVAL FILLVAL
o
AUTO ON AUTO
!'FTPMIoN,,FTP PoNI'FTPMPo
X-FEED X-FEED
OPEN OPEN
HYD
1 2 3
AUXPMP E1 PMP IAUXPMP
o,, _1o,,I
ON
o
FIGURE 6. DEDICATED CONTROL PANELFOR THE HYDRAULIC AND FUEL SYSTEMS
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MULTIFUNCTIONCONTROLPANEL
TK I AUXTK TK 2
FL VAL FLVAL FL VAL
" AUTO CLOSED AUTO
. FUELSYSTEM
TK ! AUXTK TK 2 CONFIGURATION
FWDPMP FWDPMP FWDPMP
ON ON ON
TK 1 AUXTK TK 2
AFTPMP AFTPMP AFTPMP
OFF OFF OFF
X-FEED X-FEED
CLOSED CLOSED
MULTIFUNCTIONCONTROLPANEL
HYD! _ HYD3
E! PMP i E2oNPMPI E2 PMPON ON
HYDRAULICSYSTEM
CONFIGURTION HYD! HYD2 I HYD3 I
I
AUXPMP E! PMP I AUXPMPIOFF ARM OFF
= li I
FIGURE 7. ALTERNATE CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE MULTILEGEND CONTROL PANEL
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A candidatedisplaypage is shown in Figure8. The first line on the page is
used to identifyit as the summarypage and the page number out of the total
number of summarypages is presentedin the right-handcorner. The first page
of the summaryis the nominaldisplayor defaultcondition. However,it may
be called up at any time by the summarypage key on the SSD controlpanel.
The left-handportionof the page is dedicatedto alerts. There is one alert
messageper row. The messageidentifiesthe system,the componentwithin the
system,and the fault. Withina prioritycategoryitems are listed
chronologicallywith the most recentitemat the top of the category.
SUMMARY cRuisE
r-'- .........-
! i
=HYD SYI OFF = FUEL REMAINING
_,HYDsY2:L0_ PRESSi _m__
tii_i_i_Ei_L_i_i_y_iiTi_K_iii_L_i_:_RE!i_S_iCABI N A i R
1 CABIN ALTITUDE
1
I
!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
L _1
LEGEND: "
..... RED YELLOW _ GREEN __ BLUE
FIGURE 8. FORMAT FOR THE SUMMARY STATUS PAGE
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The exampleshows two font sizes: the largersize is used for page
identificationand the smallersize is used for the remainderof the
information. The larger font subtendsa visualangle of 26 minuteswith a 4
. by 3 aspect ratio and a strokewidth of 3.2 minutes. The smallerfont
subtendsa 20 minute visualangle, the same aspect ratio,and a strokewidth
- of 1.6 minutes. This allows19 rows of fault messagesto appearon one page.
If there are more than nineteenfaultsat one time, the lower priorityfaults
appear on a secondpage.
The right side of the page providesa summarylist of checklistproceduresto
be performedduringthe flightphase. Once these proceduresare completed
this informationis erasedand the remaininginformationis systemparameters
which the crew monitorsas necessarythroughouta flightphase. The example
shown in Figure8 representsthe cruise phase of flight.
SystemsPage _ "_":_":_.-i:!:;'IL"".:_°"
. o
• . ,-." ° "t ,
There •i_S_,_setof'_stem'pageS for each aircraftsystem. These are selected
by the•system keyson the SSD controlpanel. The systempages have a summary
page and additionalpageswith more detailedinformation. There are three
alternativeformatsof each system page for the experimentalevaluation.
A typicalpictographpage with proceduresis presentedin Figure9 and the
word list in FigureI0. The firstrow is used to identifythe system and its
status. Printedwords are used for this identificationin order to providea
brief and concisestatussummary. The firstwords identifythe system,the
second words identifythe system statuswhich are color coded,and the page
numberout of the totalnumberof pages is presentedin the right-hand
corner. The next three rows containword proceduresexcept for the
pictograph-onlyformat (in which case this area remainsblank). For the
pictorialformatwith word instructions,an arrow is used to identifythe
objectof an instruction. For the word listing,the objectis identifiedby a
printedword prior to the instruction,for example,PUMP I-OFF. The remainder
of the status pagecontainsthe pictographof the systemor a structuredlist.
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FUEL ENGSTART 11z
ON
_!_ _ "
LEGEND:
--._.-_-_.-_- RED
GREEN
-- BLUE
i
FIGURE 9. PICTORIAL FORMAT FOR THE FUEL SYSTEMSPAGE ;: ...
FUEL ENG START 2/2
TK2 FWD PUMP-ON
LEGEND:
TANK ! AUX TANK TANK 2 _-;--:-RED "
iiDiiiiiiiiilili!_iiiiDiiiiiiiiiiiiii!YE,Lo,v
FILL VALVE FILL VALVE FILL VALVE
FWD PUMP FWI) PUMP FWD PUMP BLUE
AFT PUMP AFT PUMP AFT PUMP
X-FEED VALVE X-FEED VALVE
FIGURE 10. ALPHANUMERIC FORMAT FOR THE FUEL SYSTEMS PAGE
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The information analyses of the fuel and hydraulic systems identified two
pages for the fuel system and three pages for the hydraulic system. The first
page of each system provides summary information on the status and can be used
to reconfigure the system, The second page of each system provides detailed
parameter information and it may be called up at the option of the crew. In
" addition,a flightcontrolsurfacepagemay be calledup for the hydraulic
systemsince the statusof the controlsurfacesis directlyaffectedby the
hydraulicsystem status.
SYSTEMOPERATIONANDPROCEDURES
For normal proceduresthe SSD providesstatus informationand procedures
accordingto the phaseof flight. Each page identifiesthe systemsthat
requirecheckout. The crew calls up the systempage and proceedsthroughthe
checklistpresentedon the systemspage. Uponcompletionof a system,the
crew proceedsto the next systemin the sequenceuntil all the proceduresare
completed. For abnormalprocedures,the fault is annunciatedby the master
cautionand warningsystemand displayedupon the summarystatus page. The
crew selectsthe systemspage to reconfigurethe system and determineif there
are any changesin the operationallimitsof the aircraft.
Normal Procedures
When electricalpower is turnedon, the prestartsummarypage is displayed
upon the SSD. The right-handportionof the page containsthe prestart
checks. The crew proceedsto the first systemand goes throughthe
procedures. Only three checklistitems appearon a page at one time. If the
systemcan acknowledgecompletionof the procedure,it will automatically
scrollthe list. Otherwisethe crew will be requiredto depressthe scroll
key. The crew receivesfeedbackon the completionof a procedureby a change
of statuson the display. If there is a disparitybetweenthe crew action and
the systemstatus,a disagreefault is annunciated. The systemspage remains
° on until the crew selectsthe next pageor there is a change in the flight
phase (in which case it will defaultto the summarypage). Upon the
completionof a checklist,the checklistis erasedby depressingthe scroll
key. The next flightphase summarypage may be broughtup by selectingthe
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flightphase advancekey or it may occur automaticallywhen certainflight
conditionsare met (e.g.,V speeds,landinggear retract,etc.).
Abnormal Procedures B
When a fault occurs,it is annunciatedon the mastercautionand warning o
system and on the summarystatus page. The crew membermay cancel and reset
the mastercautionand/orwarningannunciatorat his discretionbut the fault
will remainon the summarypage until it is corrected. Once it is corrected,
it is erased from the list. To correcta fault the crewmember depressesthe
systemkey to bring up the systemspage. The systemspage identifiesthe
locationand the natureof the fault and presentscorrectionprocedures. The
crew member reconfiguresthe systemusing these procedures.
Throughactivationof a backup component,the fault messageis deletedand the
failedcomponentis identifiedon the systemspage only. If the system cannot
be reconfigured,the fault remainsannunciatedand the crew reviewsthe effect
it has on the operationalstateof the aircraft. This is accomplishedby _
depressingthe advancekey which will show any change in the operationalstate
of the aircraft.
The followingexampleis used to illustratethe operationof the system.
Supposeat time T1 an externalleak occurs in HydraulicSystem 2 which results
in loss of pressure. This resultsin a cautionannunciationon the master
statuspage. The first pageof the hydraulicsystem shows lossof fluid in
the reservoirand the manifoldis filledin amber with the enginepump on (see
Figure11). The procedureis to turn off the enginepump and returnto the
summarypage which now shows systemone off. The crew may elect to reviewthe
flightcontrolsystem,but this is optionalwith the lossof only one
hydraulicsystem. Now, supposethat at time'T2,the numbertwo enginepump
failson system two. The systemshouldautomaticallyswitchon the numberone w
engine pump but fails to do so. With the loss of pressurein two hydraulic
systems,a warning indicationoccurs and the two failuresare shown in red on °
the summarypage. The hydraulicpage shows the manifoldof systems1 and 2 in
red. The instructionsare to turn on the numberone enginepump. Figure12
shows the first hydraulicsystemspage with the instructionsand Figure13
4O
HYD LOPRESS _/3
OFF
" LEGEND:
...... BED
i!iiY_,,o_
A UX _//_'_ GREEN
BLUE
FIGURE 11. HYDRAULIC SYSTEMSPAGE WITH A FAILURE IN SYSTEM 1
HYD __s 1/3
ON
ADV PAGE
LEGEND:
..... RED
A_ iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiYEL,OW
_ GREEN
__ BLUE
FIGURE 12. HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS PAGE WITH A DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURE
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HYD 213
LEGEND:
------RED
ii!iiii_iiiiii_ii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!YELLOW
AUX F _ GREEN
---- BLUE
•..... _, _'f•- -(_ ..... _. - _ ..
Psi LJ
FIGURE 13. SECOND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMSPAGE WITH A DUAL FAILURE SHOWING DETAILED
STATUS INFORMATION
shows the secondpage with the detailedstatus informationthat the crew has
the optionof selecting. If the pump turns on, the manifoldturns green
indicatingnormaloperationand the alert revertsback to a caution
indication.
If the enginepump does not turn on, the crew advancesthroughthe pages to or
calls up the flightcontrolpage. As shownin Figure14, this page shows the
statusof the controlsurfacesin color code where red indicatesa failed
system,amber a partiallyfailedsystem,and green a fully operational
system. In addition,it shows the actual slat and flap positionand indicates
the operatingspeeds for the currentconfiguration. The word list alternative
is a listingof the surfacesand their statusas shown in Figure 15.
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CON _SY_-]_:O-t__Z_[_-1_-_ 1/1
V MIN - 15_ KTS
LEGEND:
" RE " _.....
.... ---.-RED
ii;_!i!!;!iiiiiiiii_iiiiiiiii!_i!!i_!iiii!i!iiiiiiiilY ELL0 W
_GREEN
0 O 0 0 @0 __:BLUE
, ....
- " "'."!" "..'_,"i'. _FIGURE 14, PICTORIAL FORMAT FOR THE. FLIGHT CONTROL PAGE WITH A DUAL. " .
.. HYDRAULIC FAILURE
CON .SYI-OFF,SY2-LO PRES_; 111
V MIN = 15@ KTS
ELEVATORS L&R OUTBID INOP
AILERONS L OUTBID INOP LEGEND:
RUDDER UPR INOP ..... RED
LG TR IM RATE REDUCED ___::_i_i__::_::_:::_:_:_:_:_:_:::::::::::::::::::::::Y ELLOW
_.i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:
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SPOILERS 1,2,4,5 INOP BLUE
BRAKES SY1 INOP
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NSE GR STR L INOP
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FIGURE 15. ALPHANUMERIC FORMAT FOR THE FLIGHT CONTROL PAGE WITH DUAL
HYDRAULIC FAILURE
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DISCUSSION
The resultsof this studyhave provideduseful insightsand guidelinesfor the
design of statusdisplaysfor aircraftsystems. However,there remaina large
numberof unansweredquestionson display formatsthat will requireempirical
evaluationand furtheranalysisbefore a comprehensiveset of display
guidelinescan be presented. °
Although it is not a new concept, the systems engineering approach used to
identify and classify the information requirements for the various aircraft
systems according to flight phase is a viable approach and it is recommended
for future design applications. The approach identifies information based
upon the crew's need for the information in order to make a decision or
perform an action. The analysis classifies the information according to type,
(e.g., identifiers, descriptors, parameter values, and instructions). This
.classification is useful in determining how the information should be
• _:;
-presented and the sizing of display pages. Although the information selection
was based upon the criticality of the information, no further attempt was made
to prioritize it or classify it according to priority. This would require
analysis of all the aircraft systems on a timeline and knowledge of their
interactions which was beyond the scope of this study.
Another key issue is the role of the crew in systems management and how much
automation should be introduced. Analysis did not resolve this question nor
will the proposed simulation study provide an answer. To resolve this
question requires a larger effort including a comparative analysis of the
alternate designs in a longitudinal study (i.e., data collection over a
significant period of the operational lifetime of the aircraft) to evaluate
the reliabilities of the alternatives. In the interim, there are somerules
that can be followed:
1. Automationshouldbe used to achievean optimumlevel of crew workload
(i.e.,to avoid overloador underload).
2. The allocationof functionsshouldprovidefor an adequatelevel of
operatorinvolvementin order to facilitatereversionto manual modes of
operationin the event of an automaticsystem failure.
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3. Informationprovidedto the crew shouldgenerallybe limitedto those
parametersthat are necessaryfor performanceof requiredcrew duties
(withoptionalcrew callupof additionalinformation).
4. For those functionsrequiringoperatorawarenessor action,the
recommendationsstatedin this report providea basis for deciding
o
betweendesignalternatives.
The flexibilityof computer-generatedisplayformatsallow the designerto
designdisplay formatsthat are appropriatefor a given levelof automation
and compatiblewith crew capabilitiesand limitations. A numberof guidelines
for formattingthe displaysbased upon human engineeringand graphicdesign
principleshave beenpresented. However,the effectivenessof a particular
formatdependson the type of operationand conditionsof use. Pictorial
formatsbased upon the functional/spatialrelationshipsof a systemhave an
intuitiveappeal and there is evidencein the literatureto supportthe
conceptthat fewer mentalsteps are requiredto interpretpictorial
information. On the other hand, abstractionand higherorder thought
processesdo not necessarilyhave any relevantpictorialimageryand such
informationmust be presentedby someother codingmethod suchas a verbal
language. The optimumapproachmay be a combinationof pictorialinformation
for identification,description,and statusand alphanumericinformationfor
instructions. A part-tasksimulationstudy would be valuableto further
evaluatepictorialinformationversusverbal informationand shouldprovide
insightinto the best formatfor specificsystemdisplayapplications.
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APPENDIXA
IN-HOUSESURVEY
° Douglas Aircraft design engineers and flight operations personnel were
surveyed to obtain their opinions of current system status displays and what
they think should be incorporated into the next generation aircraft. Twelve
design engineers and six pilots responded to the survey. A summaryof the
relevant results is presented below.
ADEQUACYOF CURRENTAIRCRAFTSTATUSINFORMATION. Except for selected design
deficiencies, the majority of the design engineers felt they were adequate as
presently implemented. The pilots thought that too much data and extraneous
data were presented.
ADEQUACYOF NORMALANDABNORMALPROCEDURES.Somedesign engineers thought
that the procedures were time consuming and did not think they were always
followed. The majority of the design engineers thought they were adequate.
The pilots stated that too much time was spent on troubleshooting. They
suggested simplicity and redundancy are required in order to improve crew
operations.
IMPROVEMENTSTHAT COULDBE MADE IN NEXTGENERATIONAIRCRAFT. Design engineers
stated that automatic fault monitoring and reconfiguration should be
incorporated. The majority felt that fail-safe operations should be part of
the basic systems design and failures should be annuciated with minimum false
alarms. Pilots agree with automated switching of redundant systems and
fail-safe operation and to display only the limitations that are imposed on
the operation of the aircraft.
RATINGOF THE DIFFERENTFEATURESOF A MANAGEMENTSYSTEM. The respondents were
asked to rate different features of a system managementsystem on their
desirability and their feasibility. The consensus of each group is presented
° in Table AI. The results are presented as a positive (+), an indifferent (0)
or a negative (-) attitude towards a feature.
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TABLE A1
ATTITUDE OF RESPONDING PERSONNEL TO FEATURES OF A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DESI RABI LITY FEASIBILITY
FEATURE ENG FLT OP$ ENG FLT OP$
PROCEDURES + + + 0
PROMPTING + + 0 --
AUTOCONFIGURAT ON 0 + + --
ALERTS + + + 0
TREND ANALYSIS + + + 0
FAULT DIAGNOSIS - 0 + O
• i ¸
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APPENDIXB
AIRCRAFTMANUFACTURERSSURVEY
Representativesof three airframemanufacturerswere interviewed. These
interviewswere conductedin order to take advantageof previousexperiencein
the developmentof systemmanagementdisplays,and from the advancedconcepts
.... being developedfor NASA Langley. Threecompanieswere interviewed:
McDonnellAircraft,St. Louis,who has developedthe F-18aircraft,Lockheed
Aircraft,Georgia,who is developingthe advancedcrew stationfor NASA
Langley,and BoeingAircraft,Seattle,who is developingthe Functional
Requirementsfor a MultifunctionFlightManagementControl/displayUnit.
McDonnellAircraftused an iterativedesignand developmentcycle for the F-18
cockpit. The requirements,displays,and displayformatswere developedby a
steeringcommittee. The prototypedesignswere evaluatedby simulation
whereinboth objectiveand subjectivemeasureswere used. The design process
was reiterateddependingon the resultsof the simulation. The aircraftuses
multifunctiondisplaysand statusinformationis providedby printedword
lists. Controlof the displaysis by multifunctionswitcheswhich are located
on the perimeterof the CRT's and indexedby the CRT's.
LockheedAircraftis developingan advancedcockpitby a researchteam
composedof systemdesigners,pilots,and human factorengineers. Basically
the same approachis being used at McDonnell's,the group developsthe
conceptsand it is evaluatedand refinedby simulation. The stationis a
two-mandesk top consolewith six split image CRT displaysand side stick
controllers. A combinationof pictorialand printedword formatswill be
used. Other data entry deviceswill be via keyboardsand touch panels.
BoeingAircraftis developingan advancedflightmanagementcontroldisplay
unit. Their approachis to reviewexistingunits,reviewthe operationaland
informationrequirements,and developa design conceptusing hardware
• componentsthat are availablefor the next generationaircraft. The basic
designconsistsof a flat panel alphanumericdisplayand a multilegend
keyboard. Page selectionis via branchinglogic.
The surveyquestionsand the responsesare presentedin TableB1
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TABLE B1
RESULTS OF THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS' SURVEY
QUESIlON MCDONNELLAIRCRAFT LO(3<HEEDAIRCRAFT BOEING AIRCRAFT
I Current cc_kpit design philosophy Display by exception was the basic Display by exception is tee basic Display by exception is the basle
is leaning towards the quiet cooKplt deslgn philosophy used for the F-18 phllosophy. Contingencies come u_ phllosophy, however, the crew will
concept or display by exception. This design. One problem wlth ii Is the automatically. Ho_ever, the ere, stlll want slatus Informatlon
would mean that the system status requirement to present trend has the ability to erase and accordlng to fllght phase and
information would be displayed when a Information. We had to provide the recall, workload conditions.
fault oCcurs or If the crew Is pilot with predictive cues in the
required to reconflgure the syslcm flight dlrecfor display.
during any portion of the mlssion. Do
you agree wlth this philosophy?
Justify your response.
2) The dlsplay by exceptlon philosophy We used an irteractive approach Over time an iteratlve approach The Identlflcatlon of all
requires the aircraft designer to be using slmulation and flight test to wlll Identlfy all contingencies, contingencies Is prohlbltlve. The
able to Identify all prebab!e Identlty those requirements which deslgner needs to Identlfy the
eontingencles prior to their were not predicted, major ones which are known to be
::c-_r.-ce. De you berieve *his is critical to the operation of the
::_:=!e_ Justify vour resr_se, alrcraft.
3) An alternative to the display by Alternat,ve display formats are The crew needs the ability to call Different levels of detall should
exception concept is to provlde dlsplayed upon demand. Both up a system upon demand. The be provlded u_x_ncrew demand In
comprehensive Information to the crew. format_ are Incorporated Irto the system will alert the cre_ to _ addltlon to the display by
Is this a viable alternative? deslgn, redundant fallure (fall safe) and exception.
the crew wlll have the option to
Inhlblt the alert or call up a
detalled dlsplay.
4) Advanced aircraft designs are using Displays requiring near or Dedicated displays are required for Except for APt,'start and with
multlformat crt displays for system eontlnuous lookup should be emergency power ¢ondltlons. These proper redundancy, dedlcated
status Information. Do you believe dedlcated. In the F-18 these were Include englne, APU. displays are not necessary. Time
all status InformaTlon should be the englne and Inertial navlgatlon pressurization, Ice/raln or flight crltlcal condltlons would
presented on multlfunction displays, dlsplays, protection, and exterlor lights, be candldates for dedicated
or should dedicated displays be used displays.
for all or part of the Information?
Justify your response.
5) One advantage of current avionics
technology is the prollferatlon of
dlgltal computers. Computers can old
the crew In performlng a variety of
tasks. Evaluate the deslrability and
the feasibility of the follo_Ing
computational alds for both normal and
abnormal procedures.
Information Storage. Menus, Yes, checklists should be provlded. Yes, checklists should be provl_ed. Checklists are desirable. There
checklists, and performance data may are developmental problems to
be stored, updated, and dlsplayed by overcome.
fllght phase or upon demand.
0 I i •
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TABLE B1 "
RESULTS OF THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS' SURVEY (Continued)
QUESTION MCDONNELLAIRCRAFT Lad<HEED AIRCRAFT BOEING AIRCRAFT
Prompting, Switch posltlon and It would be desirable for critical No response. If the display system Is designed
operatlonnal status of the system may systems but difficult to implement, correctly promptlng Is not
be sensed and, wlth the aid of necessary. It defeats the concept
computer loglc, promptlng cues may be of a quiet cockplt.
_{splayed to assist the crew.
Pricrltization and Inhibition of A combination of sense modallties The FAA Alert Standardlzatlon Study The results of the FAA's Alert
Faults. Loglc trees may be used to were used. Voice alerts were guldelines are belng Incorporated Standardlzatlon Study are being
prioritize faults accordlng to llmlted to the six most crltlcal Into the deslgn, applled.
criticality or Inhibit the fault w,arnings. Aural alerts were used
according to the flight phase, for nine to ten warnings. The
master caution and warning
annunciator and vlsual
annunciations were used for all
alerts.
Trend Analysis, The rate of change of We were backed into trend analysis Basically we agree wlth trend It depends on the role of the crew.
critical parameter values may be and it was not by design, analysis but do not understand how If hls role Is a controller, trend
sensed and If they exceed threshold Parameters were arrived at by the to Implement It. information adds a c(_npllcation
The change In the parameter value Is steerlng cetnmlttee. Thresholds and that is unnecessary. If he Is a
ann_nciated tc the crew. parameter values were selected by fllght manager, you want to provide
slmulatlon evaluation, hlm with trend Information.
oi
Autoswitching. The logic not only The F-18 cockpit was automated as A fall operatlonal system would not The deslgn should allow manual
detects a failure but 11 checks the much as possible and status requlre the crew to Interact. pv_rl_e.
overrall status of a system and Informatlon Is presented to the However, the crew should be
reconflgures It. pilot only [f It is flight informed of the failure.
crltlcal, for the fall safe
systems, The crew Is notified only €
If there Is a change In the
operational envelope.
Fault Dlagnosls. The logic performs Diagnostics should Only be provided Messages should only be presented Dlagnostlcs should not be Included.
test routlnes to detect and annLnciate If It has an effect upon the It the operational Ilmlts of the
equipment malfunctions, mission performance, aircraft are affected.
;!
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APPENDIXC
SYSTEMDESCRIPTIONOF FUELAND HYDRAULICSYSTEM
The fuel and hydraulicsystemsare representativeof an advancedtwo engine
two-mancrew commercialair carrier. The systemsdescribedutilizecurrent
technology. Extensiveautomationwas not incorporatedin order to have
exampleswith a large numberof crew interactions.
FUEL SYSTEM
The fuel supply consists of two main tanks, an auxiliary tank, and two pumps
in each tank. A fuel manifold, crossfeed valves, fill valves, and associated
controls permit total crossfeed and transfer capability. Fuel from the
auxiliary tank is transferred normally to the main tanks through the fuel
manifold and the respectivetank fill valves. The main tanks have float
sensorsthat turn the fill valve on and off automaticallyif the auxiliary
tank pumps are on and the fillvalve is armed. Each pump has a pressure
sensorthat turns on an annunciatorwhen the pump pressureexceeds5 psi. If
a fill valve sticksin the open position,resultingin an overfillof the main
tank, the overfillis annunciated. If there is a fuel imbalance(i.e.,there
is an imbalanceof more than 900 kg betweenthe main tanks) it is
annunciated. Pump controland the crossfeed valvesare operatedmanually. A
schematicof the i_uelsystem is presentedin Figure C1.
TANK I AUXTANK TANK2
r I .... q
•' i 4
:(?N= (
_ LEGEND
" F;_ CHECKVALVE
- ® ,,,,,
- -- 0  . TO,F,KL.
FLOATVALV[
FIGURE C1. FUEL SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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HYDRAULICSYSTEM
The hydraulic system consists of three parallel, continuously pressurized
systems. System one is powered by a left engine driven pump and an auxiliary "
electrical pump. System two is normally powered by a right engine driven
pump. With loss of pressure in the system, the left engine pump is
automatically turned on. System three is powered by a right engine pump, an
electrical auxiliary pump, and a ram air turbine. The ram air turbine is
automatically deployed during flight if there is loss of hydraulic pressure in
system three. In addition, a reversible motor pump will transfer power
between systems one and three if more than a 400 psi differential in pressure
exists between the two systems. If there is a loss of quantity in either
reservoir of systems one and three, the motor pump will shut down. The
electrical pumps are used for ground operations but may also be used for
emergency operations in case the other power sources fail. A schematic of the
hydraulic system is shown in Figure C2.
All three hydraulic systems are isolated from each other so that the loss of
one system will not effect the operation of the other systems. Attachment of
the hydraulic sensors to the control surfaces are the same as the DC-IO
aircraft with the exception of the following: the engine thrust reversers are
hydraulically driven and both the upper and lower portions of the rudder have
dually redundant actuators. The connections are designed so that the aircraft
remains fully operational with the loss of one hydraulic system and the
primary flight surfaces remain operable if only one hydraulic system is
functioning.
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APPENDIXD
TASK AND INFORMATIONREQUIREMENTANALYSESFOR
THE FUEL AND THE HYDRAULICSYSTEMS
For eachof the systemsdescribedin AppendixC, analyseswere performedof
the normalproceduresand one contingency. These analysesincludedthe
following:
i. TASK FLOW ANALYSIS. This includedall decisionsand actionsrequiredby
the crew accordingto a sequential,iterativemodel. This model is
iteratedfrom missioninitiationuntil it is eithercompletedor aborted.
2. INFORMATIONREQUIREMENTSANALYSIS. For each task listedin the task flow
analysisthe informationrequiredto completea task is identifiedfor
each phaseof flight.
3. OPERATIONALSEQUENCEANALYSIS. This is a sequence of tasks (both the
crew and automated tasks) required to collect the information and perform
the decision and action tasks. A subsequent analysis was performed for
only the crew's tasks.
4. INFORMATIONCLASSIFICATION.After each informationrequirementis
identifiedit is classifiedaccordingto the type (e.g.,identifier,
descriptor,status,or instruction),the type of scale used for
presentingthe information,and the sourceof the information.
The task and information requirement analyses are presented for the normal
procedures of both systems in Figure DI and D3. Analyses are also presented
for an imbalance contingency of the fuel system in Figure D2 and a dual
hydraulic system in Figure D4. The operational sequence analysis and the
" information classification are presented in Figures D5 to D8.
Q
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